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The leading expert among American legal scholars on applications of
linguistics to law. His publications include "The Lawyer as Translator,
Representation as Text" (1992), "A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking about
Law as Language" (1989), and "A Linguistic Analysis of the Meanings
of 'Search' in the Fourth Amendment: A Search for Common Sense"
(1988). The latter won the 1988 Scholarly Paper competition of the
Association of American Law Schools. Also co-author (with Levi, Green,
and Kaplan) of "Plain Meaning and Hard Cases" in Yale Law Journal
(1994).
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Author of Dynamic Statutory Interpretation (1994), and numerous
articles on statutory interpretation including "The New Textualism"
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Author of Private Consciences and Public Reasons (1995), Fighting
Words (1995), Law and Objectivity (1992), Speech, Crime, and the Uses
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Amendment and other issues. Cardozo Professor of Jurisprudence at
Columbia University (1979-1990). Visiting Fellow or Visiting Professor
at Cambridge, Oxford, Northwestern, Princeton, NYU, Stanford. Past
president of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy.
Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
*Michael Moore, Leon Meltzer Professor of Law and
Professor of Philosophy
University of Pennsylvania Law School
A.B. University of Oregon (1964); J.D. Harvard Law School (1967); S.J.D.
Harvard Law School (1978).
A leading contemporary natural law theorist, and author of numerous
books and articles on jurisprudence, legal philosophy, philosophy of
science, and law and psychiatry, including Law and Psychiatry:
Rethinking the Relationship (1984), Act and Crime: the Philosophy of
Action and its Implications for Criminal Law (1993), The Semantics of
Judging (forthcoming), Placing Blame: A General Theory of the
Criminal Law (forthcoming), "A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation"
(1985) and "Intentions and Mens Rea" (1987). Visiting Professor at
Iowa, Northwestern, Berkeley, USC, Stanford.
* Michael Moore did not attend the Sunday session, due to a prior speaking commitment.
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A.B. Dartmouth College (1967); M.B.A. Dartmouth College (1968); J.D.
Harvard Law School (1972).
Author of The Law of Obscenity (1976), Free Speech: A Philosophical
Inquiry (1982), and Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination
of Rule-based Decision Making in Law and in Life (1991) and The
Philosophy of Law: Readings and Commentary (with Walter Sinnott-
Armstrong, 1995), and numerous articles on legal interpretation including
"Constitutional Positivism" (1993), "The Practice and Problems of Plain
Meaning" (1992), "Statutory Construction and the Coordination Function
of Plain Meaning" (1990) and " Formalism" (1988). Previously Professor
of Law, University of Michigan.
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Reasoning" (1993), and "Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State"
(1989). Vice chair of the American Law Institute. Fellow, American
Academy of Arts and Sciences.
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Charles Fillmore, Professor in the Graduate School and
Professor Emeritus of Linguistics (former department chair)
University of California, Berkeley
B.A. University of Minnesota (1950); Ph.D. (Linguistics) University of
Michigan (1961).
One of the foremost lexical semanticists [specialists in word meaning]
in the United States, with extensive publications on semantic theory,
lexical semantics, English and Japanese grammar, and discourse analysis.
Co-editor of Studies in Linguistic Semantics (1971) and Individual
Differences in Language Ability (1979). Invited to lecture on lexical
** A family emergency prevented Cass Sunstein from attending more than the Friday session.
1995]
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
semantics (most recently) in Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Italy, Sweden,
Japan, and Taiwan; gave keynote address at the 1994 annual meeting of
the European Association of Lexicography [dictionary writing] in
Amsterdam; serving as outside consultant to a European Community
dictionary writing team.
Michael Geis, Professor Emeritus of Linguistics
Ohio State University
B.A. Rice University (1961); Ph.D. (Linguistics) Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (1970).
Theoretical pragmaticist [specialist in the study of the contributions of
context to meaning]. Author of The Language of Television Advertising
(1981), The Language of Politics (1988) and Speech Acts and Conversa-
tional Interaction (forthcoming-a study of the structural and
interactional features of conversation), as well as articles on diverse
linguistic subjects, including "Linguistic Deception in Television
Advertising" (1980), "Mental Logic and Sentence Comprehension"
(1984), and "A Linguistically Motivated Theory of Conversational
Sequences" (1990). Has consulted in the areas of trademark law,
deceptive advertising, and the language of jury instructions in death
penalty cases.
Georgia Green, Professor of Linguistics
Beckman Institute (Cognitive Science group),
University of Illinois/Urbana-Champaign
A.B. (1966); A.M. (1969); Ph.D. (Linguistics) The University of Chicago
(1971).
A leading theoretical linguist who has published widely on matters of
syntactic theory and on semantic and pragmatic interpretation in natural
language understanding. Author of Pragmatics and Natural Language
Understanding (1989); co-editor of Linguistic Complexity and Text
Comprehension (1988). Author of numerous articles including "Ambigu-
ity Resolution and Discourse Interpretations," "Linguistic Analysis of
Conversation as [Criminal] Evidence" (1990) and "The Universality of
Gricean Interpretation" (1990). Also co-author (with Cunningham, Levi,
and Kaplan) of "Plain Meaning and Hard Cases" in Yale Law Journal
(1994). Consultant in a number of legal cases centering on interpretation
of covertly recorded conversations.
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Jeffrey P. Kaplan, Associate Professor of Linguistics
San Diego State University
A.B. The University of Chicago (1965); Ph.D. (Linguistics) University of
pennsylvania (1976); J.D. University of San Diego School of Law (1994).
Author of English Grammar: Principles and Facts, and numerous
linguistic articles on syntax, pragmatics, and sociolinguistics, including
"Syntax in the Interpretation of Legal Language: The vested vs.
contingent Distinction in Property Law" (1993). Also co-author (with
Cunningham, Levi, and Green) of "Plain Meaning and Hard Cases" in
Yale Law Journal 103:6 (1994). Kaplan is one of a handful of linguistic
professors in the country with a J.D. degree, and has consulted in a
number of legal cases involving the interpretation of the language of
legal documents and taped conversations.
Judith N. Levi, Associate Professor of Linguistics (former department chair)
Northwestern University
B.A. Antioch College (1964); M.A. (1972); Ph.D. (Linguistics) The
University of Chicago (1975).
The leading expert among American linguists on language and law, an
area in which she has been publishing for 15 years. Author of The
Syntax and Semantics of Complex Nominals (1978) and Language and
Law: A Bibliographic Guide to Social Science Research in the U.S.A.
(1994), and co-editor (with Anne Graffam Walker) of Language in the
Judicial Process (1990). Her articles and chapters on language and law
include "Language as Evidence: The Linguist as Expert Witness in North
American Courts" (1994), "Evaluating Jury Comprehension of Illinois
Capital Sentencing Instructions" (1993), and "The Study of Language in
the Judicial Process" (1990). She is co-author (with Cunningham, Green
and Kaplan) of "Plain Meaning and Hard Cases" in The Yale Law
Journal 103:6 (1994). Has served as consultant and/or expert witness in
25 civil and criminal cases centering on language interpretation.
Jerrold Sadock, Glen A. Lloyd Distinguished Service Professor of
Linguistics (former department chair)
The University of Chicago
B.S. (1965); M.A. (1967); Ph.D. (Linguistics) University of Illinois (1969).
A leading theoretical linguist who has published widely in many areas
of linguistics, including syntax, semantics, pragmatics, and Scandinavian
and Eskimo languages. Author of Toward a Linguistic Theory of Speech
Acts (1974), Autolexical Syntax: A Theory of Parallel Grammatical
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Representations (1991), and many articles including "Ambiguity Tests
and How to Fail Them" (1975), "The Pragmatics of Subordination"
(1984), and" The Position of Vagueness Among Linguistic Insecurities"
(1986). Has served as consultant in a variety of legal cases concerning
language interpretation.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Problems Considered ................................ 797
Friday, March 31 .................................. 800
1. Opening Session ............................ 800
Following a brief opening session, the conferees divided into groups of
four, two linguists and two legal scholars, to work through the discussion
problems in three sessions during the rest of the day. These small group
discussions were not transcribed.
2. Setting the Agenda ........................... 817
On the first evening, the linguists and the legal scholars met separately
for an hour to share the small group discussions and to discuss ideas for the
agenda for the balance of the conference. The participants then met briefly
as a group to discuss agenda setting; This discussion was transcribed.
Saturday, April 1. ................................... 824
1. The Meaning of Meaning: In Linguistics ............ 825
In this section, the six linguists attempted to explain how linguists view
and analyze the term meaning. The linguists expressed a preference for the
term "conventional meaning" over the more traditional "literal meaning"
since the former provides a salutary emphasis on linguists' view that the
meaning of words is best viewed as a function of the conventional patterns
of usage for those words in a speech community, rather than as some
abstract entity inhering in the words themselves.
Georgia Green expressed her view that words themselves don't "have"
meaning, and that "meaning" is a property of the people using the words,
rather than a property of the words themselves. In this view, word meaning
becomes more a pragmatic phenomenon (as a function of speakers'
assumptions about a shared audience, and about the audience's assumptions
about the speaker, etc.) than a semantic one (as a function of the language
form itself), and we assign meaning to words in a way closely analogous
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to the way we assign referents to proper names. This view was not fully
shared by the other linguists.
Charles Fillmore and Judith Levi commented on the many dimensions
of meaning that are studied in linguistics, and identified the three major
contributors to the meaning of an utterance as word meaning (called
"lexical semantics"), sentence meaning (called "sentential semantics" or
"compositional semantics," and often "truth-conditional semantics"), and
context meaning (called "pragmatics"). They emphasized that any theory
of meaning must account for all three dimensions, which in turn are
interdependent in interesting ways. One of these is that the newest approach
to the study of meaning-pragmatics-has demonstrated that word meaning
and sentence meaning are much more dependent on context (the focus of
pragmatics) than linguists used to believe. Georgia Green took this
demonstration one step further by arguing that the notion of "meaning
independent of context" (sometimes said to be the subject of "semantics"
in opposition to "pragmatics") itself is meaningless since every actual
utterance of human language is made-and interpreted-in some context.
2. A Vehicle in the Park By Any Other Name .......... 839
Bill Eskridge asked the linguists to make their theory of meaning
concrete by applying it to the "Vehicles in Park" discussion problem, in
particular the question of whether the prohibition applied to ambulances
entering the park. A very lively discussion ensued during which the
linguists maintained that a judicial decision holding that the vehicle
prohibition did not apply to ambulances could not be described as an
"interpretation" of the "meaning" of the text. The concept of "regulatory
variable," developed by Judith Levi and Bill Eskridge during one of the
small group discussions on Friday, was then introduced as a possible
explanation for such a judicial decision. If "vehicle" is treated as a
regulatory variable, then an agency charged with regulating conduct under
that law would have discretion to vary the application of the term beyond
the conventions of usage recognized within ordinary language. Fred
Schauer thought the concept useful but added that it mattered very much
which regulating agencies had authority to treat statutory terms as variables;
we might not want to give police officers the same discretion as judges.
The linguists gave new life to this hypothetical so familiar to legal scholars
by showing how "all" and "prohibited" could receive the same kind of
interpretive attention as "vehicle," and by explaining how "vehicle"
presents specific kinds of linguistic features that make it an indeterminate
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term. The interpretation challenge would be different if the law stated: "All
bicycles are prohibited from the park."
3. The Meaning of Meaning: In Law ................ 875
Fred Schauer began with an overview of several major approaches
to meaning current within American legal scholarship. Michael Moore
laid out the 10 elements of legal interpretation that he uses in seminars
he leads for judges. The linguists discussed parallels between Moore's
10 elements and linguistic principles of interpretation. Clark
Cunningham offered a deliberately tendentious suggestion that "interpre-
tation" and "meaning" are deliberately used by lawyers and judges in an
ambiguous way to deceive the lay public into believing that when judges
say they are "interpreting the meaning of the law" they are using those
words according to the conventional meanings of "interpret" and "mean-
ing" when in fact they are engaging in decisionmaking that is not
constrained by the words of the text.
4. What Makes Linguistics a Science? ............... 898
Judith Levi began by pointing out that Chomsky's extraordinary
contributions to linguistics begin with his transforming the discipline into
a theory-building science, that is, one that follows rigorous scientific
method in formulating hypotheses about testable/falsifiable data, making
predictions from those hypotheses, testing those predictions, revising the
hypotheses accordingly, and so forth. Charles Fillmore noted that if
someone (such as a law professor discussing the sentence with knowingly
from the X-Citement Video case) claims that its syntax works differently
from other sentences in English, then a linguist would respond that (1) the
nature of linguistic theories is that they are intended to cover the full range
of instances of the phenomenon under investigation (such as subordinate
clauses like the ifclause in that case), and (2) a criticism of a current
theory would therefore have to be in the form of an opposing theory that
also was intended to cover a similarly broad range of instances of the
phenomenon, rather than claiming an ad hoc exception to the patterns
accounted for in the theory.
In the discussion that followed, the linguists were concerned with
distinguishing between (a) a rule or presumption from the legal world, such
as a scienter requirement based on general criminal law, that can "trump"
the language of a particular statute, and (b) a claim-that the linguists do
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not find valid-that the language of a particular statute can isolate
empirically discovered syntactic patterns of English. Thus, the linguists
would say that the Supreme Court's decision in X-Citement Video can be
attributed to a decision of type (a) but cannot be justified by a claim of
type (b).
Jerry Sadock then began a direct consideration of linguistics as a science
by noting that the word "science" is itself both ambiguous (in a less
troublesome way) and vague (in a more troublesome way). The term is
vague in that many terms which describe its constituent parts are
"fudgeable" to a certain extent, such as "falsifiability" and "prediction."
Nevertheless, he would rate linguistics fairly high as a science-lower than
physics but higher than cultural anthropology and legal theories. And he
would characterize as "theory" (in linguistics, as elsewhere) "that body of
abstract statements which together imply things about the data that we can
test directly through experiment."
Responding to Clark Cunningham's hypothetical in which two linguists
engage in introspection and come up with opposing analyses of the same
phenomenon, and to Fred Schauer's query about how linguists decide
whose theory is better, Jerry Sadock explained that the way to decide
would be to ascertain the predictions made by each analysis/theory and to
test those predictions empirically. Jerry Sadock and Georgia Green
explained that sometimes those tests can be accomplished by introspection
by trained experts (i.e., linguists). Judith Levi then clarified that different
kinds of linguistic predictions may need to be tested by different methods,
ranging from introspection to questionnaires for native speakers to analyses
of new data bases assembled by computer searches. She also emphasized
that the domains of word meaning and syntax are very different, in that the
latter shows far more interspeaker agreement than the former.
Michael Geis emphasized that he shared the concern of some of the law
professors about overreliance on introspection and intuition, but that
Chomsky had long ago pointed out that however one collects one's data,
by surveys or physical equipment or questionnaires, we still must evaluate
and refine all of these methods by using our (trained, expert) intuition
and/or the intuitions of other native speakers. Charles Fillmore then
concurred by pointing out that even with the assistance of data from very
large corpora [extensive sets of transcribed natural language data]
consisting of millions of words, which have recently become available
through computer technology, a native speaker can still have accurate
intuitions that permit her to say, "I know that such-and-such is a part, or
a sentence, or an expression in English, even though it's not in the corpus."
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(The reason that no corpus will ever be big enough to embrace all the
knowledge that a native speaker can access through introspection is that, as
Chomsky showed, the actual set of English sentences is an infinitely
extendable one.)
Sunday; April 2 . .................................... 920
1. The Case of the Befuddled Bride ................. 922
Chuck Fillmore introduced a pre-nuptial agreement he had been asked
to analyze by lawyers for the wife who stood to receive very little in a
pending divorce if the agreement were enforced. He suggested that the
agreement was so incomprehensible that it should be treated as an
"incompetent text" and therefore not a binding contract. He reported that
the wife's lawyers did not identify as incomprehensible provisions that to
him and his linguistic colleagues were clearly so. The trial judge refused
to hear the linguistic expert testimony.
The legal scholars were able to agree on a meaningful interpretation of
a provision that Charles Fillmore offered as particularly incomprehensible.
The discussion concluded on the topic of what competence enabled the
legal scholars to make sense of this document: Was it ability to understand
a special kind of language or was it a set of shared values and understood
legal principles?
2. The Case of the Faithful Servant (Or Dynamic Statutory
Interpretation Meets the Regulatory Variable) ......... 940
Bill Eskridge illustrated both his theory of dynamic statutory interpreta-
tion and the concept of a regulatory variable (see above), by reworking a
famous 19th century hypothetical involving instructions to a servant to
"fetch soupmeat every Monday at the comer store." The legal scholars and
linguists worked through a number of variations and generally expressed
delight at the explanatory force of the example.
3. Doubt About Reasonable Doubt .................. 953
The 1994 Supreme Court decision in Victor v. Nebraska was used to
focus discussion on the problem of jury instruction comprehensibility. The
linguists showed a wide variety of ways in which definitions of "reasonable
doubt" were confusing or indeterminate. Clark Cunningham concluded by
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proposing two empirical experiments to test (1) whether linguists were
better than judges at predicting whether jurors would be confused by jury
instructions, and (2) whether jury instructions drafted with the assistance of
linguists would be significantly more comprehensible than instructions
written only by lawyers and judges.
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PROBLEMS CONSIDERED
The following memorandum was written by Clark Cunningham and
distributed to participants prior to the Law and Linguistics Conference.
The plan is for us to spend most of Friday in small groups of four (two
linguists and two lawyers) discussing the following problems. The member-
ship of the discussion group will shift for each problem with the goal that
each person from one discipline will have been in small group discussion
with every person from the other discipline by the end of the day.
For each problem, the same set of questions can frame discussion:
1. Is the legal text indeterminate as a matter of ordinary English?
2. If the text is indeterminate, does the indeterminacy arise from (a)
syntax, (b) semantics, or (c) pragmatics?
3. How can the indeterminacy be resolved in interpreting the text?
4. How do linguists and lawyers differ in analyzing and answering the
above three questions?
Last Tuesday I mailed to you materials which should be reviewed for
Discussion Problems 2-4. As important as it is for each of us to do our
"assigned" background reading in the other discipline for the conference,
I think it is even more important that all of us have read carefully the
materials for the discussion problems.
Our original hope was that most of the discussion problems would be
based on cases to be argued before the Supreme Court next fall. Unfortu-
nately, I have identified only one such case so far. The Court has granted
review in very few cases since mid-February, which is the cut-off for when
cases will be argued, this term (before May) or next term (starting in
October). If the Court grants review in another interesting case next week,
we may substitute that case for one of the following discussion problems
(probably Two).
DISCUSSION PROBLEM ONE
A. VEHICLES IN THE PARK (see readings by H.L.A. Hart, Fuller,
Moore, Schauer)
Assume the following city ordinance promulgated by a single person, the
Mayor: "ALL VEHICLES ARE PROHIBITED FROM LINCOLN PARK."
Which of the following are prohibited from the park?
(I) A baby carriage pushed by a mother.
(2) A bicycle ridden by a 12-year-old boy.
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(3) An ambulance passing through en route to the hospital.
(4) A fully operational tank mounted as a WWII monument.
(5) A fully operational airplane mounted as a WWII monument.
(6) A gasoline powered moped ridden by a 15-year-old boy.
(7) An electrically powered wheelchair used by a paraplegic.
I encourage you to look up at least three different dictionary definitions of
"vehicle" to see if they assist you in your task.
B. DOGS ON LEASH
Assume the following city ordinance promulgated by a single person, the
Mayor: "PERSONS WALKING DOGS IN PUBLIC PARKS MUST HAVE THEIR
DOGS LEASHED."
Which of the following persons have violated the ordinance?
(1) Pauline, who enters the park, and then walks with her dog at the end
of a 15-foot leash.
(2) Quentin, who enters the park, and then starts walking with his dog
at the end of a 5-foot leash, but the leash breaks and the dog runs free.
(3) Olive, who enters the park with her dog on a 5 foot leash, but then
sits down on a park bench to read a book and releases her dog to run free.
(4) Kent, who never enters the park, but releases his dog from his leash
while across the street and watches his dog run into the park.
C. IMPROVEMENTS
Assume a historian finds the following fragment of a city ordinance
enacted in Chicago in 1895: "ALL IMPROVEMENTS SHALL BE REPORTED TO
What can "improvements" possibly mean? What cannot possibly be
included in the meaning of "improvements" in this ordinance? How do we
know?
DISCUSSION PROBLEM TWO
DOES THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY ACT REQUIRE PROOF THAT A
PERSON WHO DISTRIBUTES A SEXUALLY EXPLICIT VIDEOTAPE
OF A MINOR KNEW THE DEPICTED PERFORMER WAS A MINOR
IN ORDER TO CONVICT?
The text at issue is the following provision of the federal child pornography
statute:
"(a) Any person who--
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(1) knowingly transports or ships in interstate or foreign commerce by
any means including by computer or mails, any visual depiction, if-
(A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and
(B) such visual depiction is of such conduct; ... shall be punished"
In United States v. X-Citement Video (11/29/94), the Supreme Court
rejected what it acknowledged as "the most natural grammatical read-
ing"-to interpret the provision so that "knowingly" modifies "involves the
use of a minor." The dissent by Scalia is one of the strongest statements by
him on textualism. I expect that the linguists will view this problem as
uninteresting as a matter of linguistic analysis. The problem is interesting
though as a very recent example of how courts wrestle with textualism
when a "literal" reading produces an undesired result.
I suggest reading the materials on this problem mailed Tuesday in
following order:
(1) NYT article dated 3/1/94 (review granted)
(2) Statute at issue: 18 USC § 2252
(3) NYT article dated 10/6/94 (oral argument)
(4) Other Circuit Court interpretations of 18 USC § 2252
(5) The truly brief amicus brief on behalf of the Law & Linguistics
Consortium
(6) NYT article dated 11/30/94 (the decision)
(7) The Court's opinion
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